Q&A: What does China’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for …

Summary

<p>President Xi Jinping has personally pledged to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below...</p> <p>The post <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-paris-agreement-pledge-mean-for-climate-action/">Q&A: What does China’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org">Carbon Brief</a>.</p>

<p>President Xi Jinping has personally pledged to cut China’s greenhouse gas emissions to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”.</p>

<p>This is China’s third pledge under the <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/interactive-the-paris-agreement-on-climate-change/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Paris Agreement</a>, but is the first to put firm constraints on the country’s emissions by setting an “<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">absolute</a>” target to reduce them.</p>

<p>China’s leader spoke via video to a UN climate summit in New York organised by secretary general António Guterres, making comments seen as a “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/chinas-new-climate-pledge-newsom-blasts-trump-starmer-no-plans-for-cop30/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">veiled swipe</a>” at US president Donald Trump.</p>

<p>The headline target, with its undefined peak-year baseline, falls “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/24/climate/china-climate-pollution-goal" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">far short</a>” of what would have been needed to help limit warming to well-below 2C or 1.5C, according to <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/experts-what-to-expect-in-chinas-climate-pledge-for-2035/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">experts</a>.</p>

<p>Moreover, Xi’s pledge for non-fossil fuels to make up 30% of China’s energy is far below the latest forecasts, while his goal for wind and solar capacity to reach 3,600 gigawatts (GW) implies a significant slowdown, relative to recent growth.</p>

<p>Overall, the targets for China’s new 2035 “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-what-are-intended-nationally-determined-contributions/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">nationally determined contribution</a>” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement have received a lukewarm response, described as “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/440432f1-8045-43d1-972e-6864ea71de2f" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">conservative</a>”, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/sep/24/chinas-plans-to-cut-emission-too-weak-to-stave-off-global-catastrophe-say-experts" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">too weak</a>” and as <a href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/09/24/china-unveils-underwhelming-emissions-cutting-target-for-2035/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">not reflecting</a> the pace of clean-energy expansion on the ground.</p>

<p>Nevertheless, <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/li-shuo" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Li Shuo</a>, director of the China Climate Hub at the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Asia Society Policy Institute</a> (ASPI), tells Carbon Brief that the pledge marks a “big psychological jump for the Chinese”, shifting from targets that constrained emissions growth to a requirement to cut them.</p>

<p>Below, Carbon Brief unpacks what China’s new targets mean for its emissions and energy use, pending further details once its full NDC is formally published in full.</p>

<p><em>Carbon Brief is hosting a <a href="https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/5117588145756/WN_cAzSiQQxRvCvG15COGDypg" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">webinar</a> about China’s new climate goals on Monday. Register <a href="https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/5117588145756/WN_cAzSiQQxRvCvG15COGDypg" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">here</a>. </em></p>

<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="#pledge">What is in China’s new climate pledge?</a></li>

<li><a href="#target">What is China’s first ‘absolute’ emissions reduction target?</a></li>

<li><a href="#renewables">What has China pledged on non-fossil energy, coal and renewables?</a></li>

<li><a href="#emissions">What does China say about non-CO2 emissions?</a></li>
</ul>

<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What is in China’s new climate pledge?</h3>

<p>For now, the only available information on China’s 2035 NDC is the short series of pledges in Xi’s speech to the UN.</p>

<p>(This article will be updated once the NDC itself is published on the <a href="https://unfccc.int/NDCREG" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">UN’s website</a>.)</p>

<p>Xi’s speech is the first time his country has promised to place an absolute limit on its greenhouse gas emissions, marking a significant shift in approach.</p>

<p>Xi had <a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-china/index.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">previously pledged</a> that China would peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”, without defining at what level, reaching “carbon neutrality” by 2060.</p>

<p>He also outlined a handful of other key targets for 2035, shown in the table below against the goals set in previous NDCs.</p>

<table class="tablepress tablepress-id-195" id="tablepress-195">
<thead>
<tr class="row-1">
<th class="column-1">Indicators</th><th class="column-2" colspan="2"><center>Targets for 2030</center></th><th class="column-4">Targets for 2035</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody class="row-striping row-hover">
<tr class="row-2">
<td class="column-1"></td><td class="column-2"><b>First NDC (2016)</b></td><td class="column-3"><b>NDC 2.0 (2021)</b></td><td class="column-4"><b>NDC 3.0 (2025)</b></td>
</tr>
<tr class="row-3">
<td class="column-1">Emissions target</td><td class="column-2">Peak CO2 “around 2030”, “making best efforts to peak early”</td><td class="column-3">Peak CO2 “before 2030” and “achieve carbon neutrality before 2060”</td><td class="column-4">Cut GHGs to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035</td>
</tr>
<tr class="row-4">
<td class="column-1">CO2 intensity reduction (compared to 2005)</td><td class="column-2">60-65%</td><td class="column-3">>65%</td><td class="column-4">-</td>
</tr>
<tr class="row-5">
<td class="column-1">Non-fossil share in primary energy mix</td><td class="column-2">Around 20%</td><td class="column-3">Around 25%</td><td class="column-4">30%</td>
</tr>
<tr class="row-6">
<td class="column-1">Forest stock volume increase (compared to 2005)</td><td class="column-2">Around 4.5bn cubic metres</td><td class="column-3">6bn cubic metres</td><td class="column-4">11bn cubic metres</td>
</tr>
<tr class="row-7">
<td class="column-1">Installed capacity of wind and solar power</td><td class="column-2">-</td><td class="column-3">>1,200GW</td><td class="column-4">>3,600GW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>In his speech, Xi also said that, by 2035, “<a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/glossary/china/index.html#section-new-energy-vehicle" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">new energy vehicles</a>” would be the “mainstream” for new vehicle sales, China’s <a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/glossary/china/index.html#section-ets" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">national carbon market</a> would cover all “major high-emission industries” and that a “climate-adaptive society” would be “basically established”.</p>

<p>This is the first time that China’s targets will cover the entire economy and all greenhouse gases (GHGs), a move that has been <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3142771/chinas-2060-carbon-neutral-goal-covers-other-greenhouse-gases" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">long signalled</a> by Chinese policymakers.</p>

<p>In 2023, the joint China-US <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-16-november-sunnylands-statement-china-methane-plan-coal-capacity-payments/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Sunnylands statement</a>, released during the Biden administration, had said that both countries’ 2035 NDCs “will be economy-wide, include all GHGs and reflect…[the goal of] holding the increase in global average temperature to well-below 2C”.</p>

<p>Subsequently, the world’s first global stocktake, issued at <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop28-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-dubai/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">COP28</a> in Dubai, “encourage[d]” all countries to submit “ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all GHGs, sectors and categories…aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5C”.</p>

<p>Responding to this the following year, executive vice-premier and <a href="https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/ClimateChinaGovernance_fin_web.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">climate lead</a> Ding Xuexiang stated at <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202411/t20241114_11526095.shtml" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">COP29</a> in Baku that China’s 2035 climate pledge <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-14-november-2024-cop29-special-edition/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">would</a> be economy-wide and cover all GHGs. (His remarks did not mention alignment with 1.5C.)</p>

<p>This was <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202504/t20250423_11602660.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">reiterated</a> by Xi at a climate meeting between world leaders in April 2025.</p>

<p>The absolute target for all greenhouse gases marks a turning point in China’s emissions strategy. Until now, China’s emissions targets have largely focused on <a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/glossary/china/index.html#section-carbon-intensity" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">carbon intensity</a>, the emissions per unit of GDP, a metric that does not directly constrain emissions as a whole.</p>

<p>The change aligns with China’s broader shift from “<a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/glossary/china/index.html#section-dual-control-of-energy" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">dual control of energy</a>” towards “<a href="https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/glossary/china/index.html#section-dual-control-of-carbon" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">dual control of carbon</a>”, a policy that <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-8-august-record-extreme-weather-first-quarterly-co2-fall-since-covid-dual-control-of-carbon-emissions/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">replaces</a> China’s current tradition of setting targets for energy intensity and total energy consumption, with carbon intensity and carbon emissions.</p>

<p>Under the policy, in the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), China will continue to centre carbon intensity as its main metric for emissions reduction. After 2030, an absolute cap on carbon emissions will become the predominant target. </p>

<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What is China’s first ‘absolute’ emissions reduction target?</h3>

<p>In his UN <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kc9AOAi5_G98XrdJWJaQwOV4zQlUnwdfg6YOcm7WmsM/edit?tab=t.0" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">address</a>, Xi pledged to cut China’s “economy-wide net greenhouse gas emissions” to 7-10% below peak levels by 2035, while “striving to do better”.</p>

<p>This means the target includes not just CO2, but also methane, nitrous oxide (N2O) and F-gases, all of which make significant contributions to global warming. (See: <a href="#emissions">What does China say about non-CO2 emissions</a>?)</p>

<p>The reference to “economy-wide net” emissions means that the target refers to the total of China’s emissions, from all sources, minus removals, which could come from natural sources, such as afforestation, or via “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/nine-key-takeaways-about-the-state-of-co2-removal-in-2024/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">carbon dioxide removal</a>” technologies.</p>

<p>Outlining the targets, Xi told the UN summit that they represented China’s “best efforts, based on the requirements of the Paris Agreement”. He added:</p>

<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>“Meeting these targets requires both painstaking efforts by China itself and a supportive and open international environment. We have the resolve and confidence to deliver on our commitments.”</p>
</blockquote>

<p>China has a <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/unpacking-chinas-new-headline-climate-targets" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">reputation</a> for under-promising and over-delivering.</p>

<p>Prof Wang Zhongying, director-general of the Energy Research Institute, a Chinese government-affilitated thinktank, told Carbon Brief in an <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-interview-prof-wang-yi-and-prof-wang-zhongying?utm_content=buffer80bf9&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">interview</a> at COP26 that China’s policy targets represent a “bottom line”, which the policymakers are “definitely certain” about meeting. He views this as a “cultural difference”, relative to other countries. </p>

<p>The headline target announced by Xi this week has, nevertheless, been <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/chinas-new-climate-pledge-newsom-blasts-trump-starmer-no-plans-for-cop30/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">seen</a> as falling far short of what was needed.</p>

<p>A series of experts had previously told <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/experts-what-to-expect-in-chinas-climate-pledge-for-2035/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Carbon Brief</a> that a 30% reduction from 2023 levels was the absolute minimum contribution towards a 1.5C global limit, with many pointing to much larger reductions in order to be fully aligned with the 1.5C target.</p>

<p>The figure below illustrates how China’s 2035 target stacks up against these levels.</p>

<p>(Note that the timing and level of peak emissions is not defined by China’s targets. The pledge trajectory is constrained by China’s previous targets for carbon intensity and expected GDP growth, as well as the newly announced 7-10% range. It is based on total emissions, excluding removals, which are more uncertain.)</p>

<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img alt="Economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions excluding removals, billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent" class="wp-image-59233" height="1136" src="https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Chinas-7-10-emissions-reduction-target-for-2035-falls-short-of-1.5C.png" width="1822" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions excluding removals, billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e). The pledge pathway shows the 7-10% range of 2035 cuts, followed by an indicative straight line to “carbon neutrality” in 2060, with an allowance for removals. The “<a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/charting-chinas-path-its-2035-nationally-determined-contribution" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">minimum needed</a>” pathway cuts emissions to 30% below 2023 levels by 2035 and continues in the same way to 2060. The “1.5C-aligned” pathway is the average of <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/laurimyllyvirta.bsky.social/post/3lzivq4u54k2y" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">scenarios</a> from the IPCC. Source: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA).</figcaption></figure>

<p>Analysis by the <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Asia Society Policy Institute</a> also <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/charting-chinas-path-its-2035-nationally-determined-contribution" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">found</a> that China’s GHG emissions “must be reduced by at least 30% from the peak through 2035” in order to align with 1.5C warming. </p>

<p>It said that this level of ambition was achievable, due to China’s rapid clean-energy buildout and signs that the nation’s emissions may have already <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-record-solar-growth-keeps-chinas-co2-falling-in-first-half-of-2025/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">reached</a> a peak.</p>

<p>Similarly, the <a href="https://www.iea.org/">International Energy Agency</a> (IEA) said <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-3-october-2024-new-coal-guideline-less-oil-consumption-green-hydrogen/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">last October</a> that implementing the collective goals of the first stocktake – such as tripling renewables by 2030 – as well as aligning near-term efforts with long-term net-zero targets, implied emissions cuts of 35-60% by 2035 for emerging market economies, a grouping that includes China.</p>

<p>In response to these sorts of numbers, Teng Fei, deputy director of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, previously described a 30% by 2035 target as “extreme”, telling <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2024/10/03/china-needs-ambition-to-meet-target-of-cutting-carbon-emissions-report-says/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Agence France-Presse</a> that this would be “too ambitious to be achievable”, given uncertainties around China’s current development trajectory.</p>

<p>In contrast, a January 2025 academic <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2095809924006763" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">study</a>, co-authored by researchers from Chinese government institutions and top universities and understood to have been influential in Beijing’s thinking, argued for a pledge to cut energy-related CO2 emissions “by about 10% compared with 2030”, estimating that emissions would peak “between 2028 and 2029”.</p>

<p>(Other assessments have <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-6-march-2025-two-sessions-climate-news-new-vice-minister-targets-missed/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">pegged</a> relevant indicators, such as <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-1-may-2025-xi-steadfast-on-climate-solar-and-wind-surpassed-thermal-power-controlling-short-term-ghgs/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">emissions</a> and <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-17-april-2025-us-china-tariff-war-ai-and-data-centres-coal-construction-till-2027/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">coal consumption</a>, as peaking in 2028 at the earliest.)</p>

<p>The relatively modest emissions reduction range pledged by Xi, as well as the uncertainty introduced by avoiding a definitive baseline year, has <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/unpacking-chinas-new-headline-climate-targets" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">disappointed</a> analysts.</p>

<p>In a note responding to Xi’s pledges, Li Shuo and his ASPI colleague Kate Logan write that he has “misse[d] a chance at leadership”.</p>

<p>Li tells Carbon Brief that factors behind the modest target include the “domestic economic slowdown and uncertain economic prospects, the weakening global climate momentum and the turbulent geopolitical environment”. He adds:</p>

<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>“I also think it is a big psychological jump for the Chinese, shifting for the first time after decades of rapid growth, from essentially climate targets that meant to contain further increase to all of a sudden a target that forces emissions to go down.”</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Instead of a target consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C, China’s 2035 pledge is more closely aligned with 3C of warming, according to analysis by CREA’s Lauri Myllyirta.</p>

<p><a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/press/chinas-new-target-unlikely-to-drive-down-emissions/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Climate Action Tracker</a> says that China’s target is “unlikely to drive down emissions”, because it was already set to achieve similar reductions under current policies. </p>

<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What has China pledged on non-fossil energy, coal and renewables?</h2>

<p>In addition to a headline emissions reduction target, Xi also pledged to expand non-fossil fuels as a share of China’s energy mix and to continue the rollout of wind and solar power.</p>

<p>This continues the trend in China’s previous NDC.</p>

<p>Notably, however, Xi made no mention of efforts to control coal in his speech.</p>

<p>In its second NDC, focused on 2030, China had pledged to “strictly control coal-fired power generation projects”, as well as “strictly limit” coal consumption between 2021-2025 and “phase it down” between 2026-2030. It also said China “will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad”.</p>

<p>It remains to be seen if coal is addressed in China’s full NDC for 2035.</p>

<p>The 2030 NDC also stated that China would “increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25%” – and Xi has updated this to 30% by 2035.</p>

<p>These targets are shown in the figure below, alongside recent <a href="https://file.jgvogel.cn/124/upload/resources/file/570784.pdf" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">forecasts</a> from the <a href="http://edri.sinopec.com/edri/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Sinopec Economics and Development Research Institute</a>, which estimated that non-fossil fuel energy could account for 27% of primary energy consumption in 2030 and 36% in 2035.</p>

<p>As such, China’s targets for non-fossil energy are less ambitious than the levels implied by current expectations for growth in low-carbon sources.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img alt="Past, targeted and forecast shares of China’s energy, by source" class="wp-image-59239" height="1312" src="https://www.carbonbrief.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Chinas-targets-for-non-fossil-energy-are-less-ambitious-than-forecast-growth.png" width="1984" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Past, targeted and forecast shares of China’s energy, by source, %. Source: Sinopec Economics and Development Research Institute, Xi’s 2035-pledge speech.</figcaption></figure>

<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-18-september-2025-mee-on-the-move-ai-and-energy-brics-and-climate/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">meeting</a> with the <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c1772/14jcwhhy/d14j17c/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">National People’s Congress Standing Committee</a> – the highest body of China’s state legislature – environment minister Huang Runqiu <a href="https://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202509/t20250911_447643.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">said</a> that progress on China’s earlier target for increasing non-fossil energy’s share of energy consumption was “broadly in line” with the “expected pace” of the 2030 NDC. </p>

<p>On wind and solar, China’s 2030 NDC had pledged to raise installed capacity to more than 1,200GW – a target that analysts at the time told <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-paris-agreement-pledge-mean-for-climate-change/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Carbon Brief</a> was likely to be beaten. It was duly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-solar-wind-power-installed-capacity-soars-2024-2025-01-21/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">met</a> six years early, with capacity <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-4-september-2025-shanghai-cooperation-summit-ets-absolute-emissions-cap-chinas-heatwave-adaptation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">standing</a> at 1,680GW as of the end of July 2025. </p>

<p>Xi has set a 2035 target of reaching 3,600GW of wind and solar capacity.</p>

<p>This looks ambitious, relative to <a href="https://globalenergymonitor.org/report/wind-and-solar-year-in-review-2024/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">other countries</a> and global capacity of around 3,000GW <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-installed-wind-energy-capacity-gigawatts?tab=table" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">in</a> <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/installed-solar-pv-capacity?tab=table" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">total</a> as of 2024, but represents a significant slowdown from the recent pace of growth.</p>

<p>Given its current capacity, China would need to install around 200GW of new wind and solar per year and 2,000GW in total to reach the 2035 target. Yet it <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-clean-energy-just-put-chinas-co2-emissions-into-reverse-for-first-time/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">installed 360GW</a> in 2024 and <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-record-solar-growth-keeps-chinas-co2-falling-in-first-half-of-2025/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">212GW of solar</a> alone in the first half of this year.</p>

<p>Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief this pace of additions is “not enough to even peak emissions [in the power sector] unless energy demand growth slows significantly”.</p>

<p>While the pace of demand growth is a key uncertainty, a recent <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-what-an-ambitious-2035-electricity-target-looks-like-for-china/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">study</a> by <a href="https://gps.ucsd.edu/faculty-directory/michael-davidson.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Michael R Davidson</a>, associate professor at the <a href="https://ucsd.edu/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">University of California, San Diego</a>, with colleagues at Tsinghua University, suggested that deploying 2,910-3,800GW of wind and solar by 2035 would be consistent with a 2C warming pathway.</p>

<p>Davidson tells Carbon Brief that “most experts within China do not see the [recent] 300+GW per year growth as sustainable”. Still, he adds that the lower levels outlined in his study could be consistent with cutting power-sector emissions 40% by 2035, subject to caveats around whether new capacity is well-sited and appropriately integrated:</p>

<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>“We found that 40% emissions reductions in the power sector can be supported by 3,000-3,800GW wind and solar capacity [by 2035]. Most of the capacity modeling really depends on integration and quality of resources.”</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Renewable energy’s share of consumption in China has lagged behind its record capacity installations, largely due to <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-renewable-energy" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">challenges</a> with updating grid infrastructure and <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-china-is-still-building-new-coal-and-when-it-might-stop/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">economic incentives</a> that lock in coal-fired power. </p>

<p>In Davidson’s study, capacity growth of up to 3,800GW would see wind and solar reaching around 40% of total power generation by 2030 and 50% by 2035.</p>

<p>Meanwhile, China will need to <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-china-will-need-10000gw-of-wind-and-solar-by-2060/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">install</a> around 10,000GW of wind and solar capacity to reach carbon neutrality by 2060, according to a separate report by the Energy Research Institute, a Chinese government-affilitated thinktank. </p>

<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What does China say about non-CO2 emissions?</h2>

<p>This is the first time that one of China’s NDC pledges has explicitly covered the emissions from non-CO2 GHGs.</p>

<p>However, while Xi’s speech made clear that China’s headline emissions goal for 2035 will cover non-CO2 gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide and F-gases, he did not give further details on whether the NDC would set specific targets for these emissions.</p>

<p>In China’s 2030 NDC, the country stated it would “step up the control of key non-CO2 GHG emissions”, including through new control policies, but did not include a quantitative emissions reduction target.</p>

<p>In preparation for a comprehensive greenhouse gas emissions target, China has issued action plans for <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-methane-plan-mean-for-its-climate-goals/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">methane</a>, <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-1-may-2025-xi-steadfast-on-climate-solar-and-wind-surpassed-thermal-power-controlling-short-term-ghgs/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">hydrofluorocarbons</a> (HFCs, one type of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/fluorinated-gases-f-gases" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">F-gas</a>) and <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-4-september-2025-shanghai-cooperation-summit-ets-absolute-emissions-cap-chinas-heatwave-adaptation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">nitrous oxide</a>.</p>

<p>The nitrous oxide action plan, published earlier this month, <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-4-september-2025-shanghai-cooperation-summit-ets-absolute-emissions-cap-chinas-heatwave-adaptation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">called</a> for emissions per unit of production for specific chemicals to decrease to a “world-leading level” by 2030, but did not set overarching limits.</p>

<p>Similarly, the overarching methane action plan, issued in late 2023, <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-methane-plan-mean-for-its-climate-goals/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">listed</a> several key tasks for reducing emissions in the energy, agriculture and waste sectors, but lacked numerical targets for emissions reduction.</p>

<p>A subsequent rule change in December 2024 tightened waste gas requirements for coal mines. Under the new rules, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/china-tightens-rules-curb-methane-emissions-coal-mines-2024-12-12/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Reuters</a> reports, any coal mine that releases “emissions with methane content of 8% or higher” must capture the gas, and either use or destroy it – down from a previous threshold of 30%.</p>

<p>But analysts believe that the true challenge of coal-mine methane emissions may come from <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-22-august-groundbreaking-guidelines-for-green-transition-coal-plant-approvals-drop-sharply-methane-emissions-from-abandoned-coa/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">abandoned mines</a>, which, one study <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-024-02004-3" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">found</a>, have surged in the past 10 years and will likely overtake emissions from active coal mines to become the prime source of methane emissions in the coal sector.</p>

<p>As the demand for coal could be facing a “<a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-chinas-emissions-set-to-fall-in-2024-after-record-growth-in-clean-energy/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">structural decline</a>”, the number of abandoned mines is expected to grow significantly. </p>

<p>Meanwhile, the HFC plan did set quantitative targets. The country aims to lower HFC production by 2029 by 10% from a 2024 baseline of 2GtCO2e, while consumption would also be reduced 10% from a baseline of 0.9gtCO2e in this timeframe – in line with China’s obligations under the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-2-f&chapter=27&clang=_en" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Kigali Amendment</a> to the <a href="https://www.unep.org/ozonaction/who-we-are/about-montreal-protocol" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">Montreal Protocol</a> on ozone protection.</p>

<p>From 2026, China will “prohibit” the production of fridges and freezers using HFC refrigerants. </p>

<p>However, the action plan <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/21/china-hfc-23-emissions-kigali-amendment-climate-data/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">does not govern</a> China’s exports of products that use HFCs – a significant source of emissions.</p>

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<p>The post <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-paris-agreement-pledge-mean-for-climate-action/">Q&A: What does China’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org">Carbon Brief</a>.</p>

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